



ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION

Editor-in-Chief: Silvio Scanagatta | ISSN 2035-4983

Re-thinking youth and citizenship. Value groups and citizenship types of young Finns

*Helena Helve**

Author information

*School of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Tampere, Finland.

Contact author's email address

*helena.helve@uta.fi

Article first published online

February 2015

HOW TO CITE

Helve, H. (2015). Re-thinking youth and citizenship. Value groups and citizen types of young Finns. *Italian Journal of Sociology of Education*, 7(1), 32-66.

Retrieved from <http://journals.padovauniversitypress.it/ijse/content/re-thinking-youth-and-citizenship-value-groups-and-citizenship-types-young-finns>



PADOVA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Re-thinking youth and citizenship. Value groups and citizenship types of young Finns

*Helena Helve**

Abstract: Utilizing theoretical discussions of social capital, identity, and action competence, this article examines citizenship and its relationship with societal values, formal and non-formal education, and youth work. The analysis is based on four comparative follow-up studies on value changes amongst Finnish youth between 1989 and 2011. Behind different value structures, the citizenship types of egalitarian, cosmopolitan, ecological, cynical, authoritarian, ethno-national and neo-liberal were identified with their own belief systems and doctrines. These variances were also seen as affected by gender and education level. The study ultimately reveals an observable decline in postmaterialist values among young Finns during the last economic recession, and that economic scarcity could be seen as nurturing hard, materialistic values despite difficulties of categorizing youth citizenship types outright.

Keywords: youth, values, citizenship, gender

* School of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Tampere, Finland. E-mail: helena.helve@uta.fi

Introduction

The world has changed and so have the ways in which citizens pursue and express their involvement in the public sphere. Likewise, the social parameters of what constitutes a “good” citizen are changing over time. Historically, citizens have not shared a common set of rights; on the contrary, citizenship has varied within states by fractured entitlements and identities (Cohen, 2009; Turner, 1993). Globally, people’s lives are marked by structural and age-based inequalities that prevent them from attaining full civil, political, and social citizenship rights. Contemporarily, the realities of an increasingly interconnected world with linked problems have resulted in global attention given to the citizenship rights of children¹ and young people (Earls & Carlson, 2002; Helve & Wallace, 2001; Tyyskä, 1998; Bynner et al., 1997; Jones & Wallace, 1992).

Citizenship is a concept that relates to an individual’s direct relationship with the state, and also to a wide range of voluntary bodies, independent associations, and other individual citizens of all ages. “Active” citizenship contributions are most often thought to include the ability to vote, entitlement to a passport, demonstrating respect for the law, and paying taxes. This kind of citizenship is seen as connected to civil society through a tradition of formal and non-formal political education. However, for some decades now, Europe has seen a decline in the political participation of young people, both in terms of voting and membership in political parties, as well as participation in civil society, organizations, and associations. Young people have often been under represented in industrial democracy, for example in trade unions, employees’ committees, and so on. The weak participation of young people in representative institutions is related to the fact that relatively few of them join political parties² (The Finnish Youth Barometer; Myllyniemi, 2014; The European Youth barometers, 1994; 1995; 1996; European Commission, 2012; Hoikkala, 2009).

Even though youth membership in political parties is weak compared to older people, it may not be a symptom of disinterest but of a preference for other forms of participation. Whereas older generations collectively

¹ For example, Finland has an Office of the Ombudsman for Children. The basic duty of the Ombudsman for Children is to promote the implementation of children’s rights in Finland. Emphasis is placed on promoting children being heard and their participation in society.

² An average European level proportion is 2% (European Commission, 2012, p. 237).

struggle to build nations, welfare states, and organizations, young people are busy just building their individual lives and identities (Kroger, 2007; Côté & Levine, 2002). The participatory culture for young people today is engaged in improving their lives and their communities through new anti-authoritarian social movements and civic life. They tend to focus on a single issue, or a limited range of issues connected to a single broad theme, such as animal rights, world peace, and environmentalism (Helve, 2002; 2006). Young people in these movements are active at a grass-roots level with the aim of representing the interests of small, or even marginalized, excluded groups. These new forms of collective actions can be locally based in small social groups and loosely connected to larger formal networks. These are distinctive, for example, from the traditional labor movements of older generations. The new movements and groups encourage and empower young people to create new learning spaces within micro-communities at the grass-roots level.

Modern theories of citizenship have tried to find ideal types of citizenship (see more: Frazer & Emler, 1997; Turner, 1993); some of them can be *exclusive* and at the same time *inclusive*. Immigrants and ethnic minorities are often in both exclusive and inclusive groups (Somers, 2008; Holland, 2007, pp. 23-24). In the Western world, most states underline as the ideal type of democratic citizenship regimes as those that value human rights, egalitarianism, solidarity, and institutions of civil society (Somers, 2008, p. 8). In the European context, the concept of citizenship has emerged through the evolving legislation and political thinking of the European Union. The increased mobility resulting from a single market and the migration flows have increased interactions between European citizens. Participation by each citizen in intercultural dialogue through structured co-operation with civil society is fundamental to creating a European identity and belonging to the European community. The importance of developing active European citizenship means respect for cultural diversity and the common values of the European Union. Participation and democracy are a permanent priority of the European Union, linked to its basic values, such as human rights, tolerance, solidarity, and the fight against racism and

xenophobia. These values have been nourished by developments in the process of European integration³.

Scholars can distinguish between different types of citizenship; for example *Ethnic nationalism*⁴ citizenship in Ukraine, *authoritarian*⁵ citizenship in China, and *social welfare citizenship* in the Nordic countries⁶. Of course, these categories overlap. For example, we can observe inside the sovereign borders in Ukraine, two forms of citizenship: ethnic national and authoritarian types, with recognizable boundaries and identifiable outsiders. The Crimean crisis and war in Ukraine in 2014 has raised the question about values of ethnic citizenship and justifiable reasons for the invasion of another society in the name of defense of an ethnic group. In Europe, many countries, like Finland, accept dual citizenship⁷. *Cosmopolitan* citizenship is related to an ideology that all human ethnic groups belong to a single

³ See more about the development of an active European citizenship, http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/programme/priority_themes_en.php.

⁴ Ethnic nationalism is a form, often referred as "nationalism". According to Smith (1991) members of a nation feel an intensive bond of solidarity to the nation and its members. In his interpretation, ethnic kinship, culture, language, religion etc. forms a belief system. He uses the term ethnic nationalism for non-Western concepts of nationalism as opposed to Western views of a nation defined by its geographical territory.

⁵ Cf. Adorno et al., 1950. This study was based on research about the relationship between an authoritarian personality type and various political attitudes from views of foreign policy and the Cold War, to levels of tolerance and views of race and race relations. This focus came from the horrors of the Second World War (see e.g. Fromm, 1942).

⁶ The five Nordic welfare states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) have a shared political goal of encouraging strong social cohesion, which is based on the core values of equal opportunities, social solidarity, and security for all. The model promotes social rights and the principle that everyone is entitled to equal access to social and health services, education and culture including care for social outcasts and vulnerable groups in society. Comprehensive and financially affordable child-minding services and care of the elderly enable women, especially the low-paid, to combine family and work. The welfare system is mainly funded by taxes, which are relatively high. (The Nordic Welfare Model, <http://www.norden.org/en/about-nordic-co-operation/areas-of-co-operation/the-nordic-welfare-model/about-the-nordic-welfare-model>; Helve, 2014.)

⁷ E.g. if a Finnish citizen also has the citizenship of from another state, the Finnish authorities will consider that person to be a Finnish citizen both in Finland and abroad. The authorities of other states, however, do not necessarily consider that person to be a Finnish citizen, because not all states accept multiple nationalities and citizenships in the same manner as Finland does.

community based on shared citizenship values. The citizenship values of a cosmopolitan society are inclusive as individuals from different nation-states form relationships of mutual respect despite their differing cultural, religious, or political ideologies (Sterri, 2014; Kwame, 1997). Turner (1993, p. 2) defines the concept of citizenship by sociological theory: "Citizenship may be defined as that set of practices (juridical, political, economic and cultural) which a person as a competent member of society, and which as consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups". However, participation and citizenship can have different meanings. For example, Marshall (1950) saw the liberal democratic welfare state as the basis for citizen rights. The citizens' civil, social, and political rights within the welfare state ensure the individual's integration into society, and that everyone can participate on the same level. If such rights are not developed, this may imply marginalization and less participation. Young people, as citizens of their national societies or for example the European Union, do not only have passive rights, but also a responsibility to be active citizens, implying self-provision and political participation.

Different dimensions of citizenship can also be related to degree of marginalization and integration in society, such as labor market marginalization, political marginalization as loss of influence, and participation and social marginalization as isolation and dissolution of social networks. The question is, then, how do different welfare regimes in different countries ensure citizenship rights for young people, and in what way do they influence marginalization or integration of citizens? (See more: Bynner et al., 1997).

The discourses of youth at risk have led to an emphasis on deeper questions about youth as citizens. While class relations continue to be relevant, sociologists have tried to understand the ways in which young people are making their choice biographies (Beck, 1992; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Helve, 1998). While young people's lives are lived more and more in a global context, their countries' history and geographic location form a distinctive backdrop.

Fundamental to the idea of citizenship has been *autonomy* within the state, yet for large numbers of young people, this stage has not been reached as they are excluded from such rights and obligations as voting. Now, when a growing number of (mostly young) immigrants from Africa

and refugees from Arab countries are searching for a better life in Europe, the concept of citizenship has become even more complicated, especially when many immigrants do not have any passport for citizenship from their home countries. This is, for them, a critical issue in terms of employment, income, and personal welfare⁸. It is difficult for them to become a full or even partial citizen without citizenship rights. It seems that we need to re-think the nation state concept of citizenship to incorporate a new and more flexible understanding of the concept. The citizenship concept of the traditional legacy of Marshall (1950) no longer fits within the global economy because national citizenships and national sovereignties are in constant change⁹. The globalization of modern labor markets and the increase of migrant labor, guest workers, refugees, exchange students, and so on, challenge the traditional concept of citizenship. It seems that there is no longer any justification to assume any unitary character to the concept of citizenship. For example young migrants in developed countries are becoming increasingly diverse and represent a wide range of nationalities with an array of values embedded in different cultures and ethnicities.

In the debate about European youth, “participation” has been a key word under scrutiny (European Commission, 2001). In the early days of parliamentary democracy, attention was centered on elections, and associations and organizations served a key role in involving citizens and providing them with means of influence (Gudmundsson, 2001; Helve & Bynner, 1997). Many claim that social developments in Europe are a form of globalization, and this is reflected in the internationalization of cultural, business, and political spheres. There is also, however, a globalization of problems those societies face, and at the same time, one can observe a rise in local nationalisms in some European countries (Allatt, 2001, pp. 255-261).

⁸ According to the Child Protection Information Sheet (UNICEF, 2006) some 55 % of African children under five years of age have no official birth certificate, which means that they cannot prove their nationality or obtain any citizenship or passport.

⁹ T.H. Marshall constructs a historical understanding of citizenship based on the creation of civil, political, and social rights. Putting aside the historical accuracy of Marshall’s argument, his notion of modern democratic citizenship corresponds more closely with the modern construction of reciprocal rights and obligations between the state and the individual (Klausen, 1995).

The Internet and media are changing the truths and values of young people, as they form alternative forms of participation for young people in political agencies (Helve, 2010, pp. 80-89; see also Ester & Vinken, 2003). Young people are connected in both online and offline worlds. According to Subrahmanyam and Smahel (2011, p. 216), their important offline themes, like identity and intimacy, are also reflected in their online activities and interactions¹⁰. Internet use and the leisure time activities of young people are producing their forms of citizenship, and those young people from diverse cultural settings will develop, online, their own forms of citizenship which seem to be flexible and fragmented.

Social media can engage citizens and politicians in the global media environment. Online discussion groups and forums can increase youth participation in policy and complement existing democratic structures by through two new potential instances such as *e-Voting* and *e-Participation*¹¹. However, sociologists have been skeptical about how e.g. Facebook and Twitter help spread Democracy and Human Rights (Bauman & Lyon, 2012¹²). Buckingham and Rodríguez-Hoyos (2013) research interprets, for example, what young people are learning about the wielding of power, and the prototype model citizen within the virtual world of Habbo Hotel. The research findings give a picture of a space, that is not completely satisfactory to young people. This kind of virtual world can be very far distant in practice from being the free, democratic, and creative space that it is proclaimed to be by the company that produces it. The citizens of this virtual world are powerless when their only option is to obey, something not conducive to being a model of critical citizenship (Buckingham & Rodríguez-Hoyos, 2013; Lehdonvirta et al., 2009; Mäntymäki & Salo,

¹⁰ Young people seem to use the Internet for those things that they also do in real life (offline), such as keeping in touch with friends, having fun, and learning. However, the Internet is only a tool, not another world or reality (Castronova, 2005, p. 260).

¹¹ *E-Democracy* is already a natural extension of representative and liberal democracy in most western countries. For example, in Estonia, *e-residency* and a state-issued secure digital identity for non-residents allows digital authentication and the digital signing of documents (<https://e-estonia.com/e-residents/about/>). This could be the beginning of the erosion of the classic nation state hegemony (Clippinger; see <https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/become-e-citizen-estonian-digital-society/>).

¹² See e.g. Bauman, <http://www.social-europe.eu/2012/05/do-facebook-and-twitter-help-spread-democracy-and-human-rights>.

2011).

Young people are diligent consumers, buying virtual products that will help them to construct their identities and relationships. They are also learning to be workers, undertaking forms of labor that produce surplus value in the form of social and identity capital (Côté, 2014). They are also learning in virtual world about political lessons and about the operation of social power in a situation where the powerful enjoy absolute authority (Buckingham & Rodríguez-Hoyos, 2013). If new media represents a vehicle for social innovation and progress in the hands of governments, of political representatives, and of citizens or *e-Citizens*, it means that young people must learn how to become citizens of an electronic community and how to use the Internet to become aware of what *e-Citizenship* implies. Even though the Internet enables young people to connect from all over the world through social media, this might not change government policies.

In the following section, the focus is on young people in Finland, one of the five Nordic so-called “welfare states”. This article tries to answer to the question: how are young people in Finland becoming citizens in their transition to adulthood, and how are their values connected to the changing concept of citizenship?¹³ Applying theories of socialization, social capital, identity formation, and action competence, this article discusses youth citizenship values associated with formal and non-formal education and youth work.

Becoming citizens in Finland

Regarding Finnish youth policy, the purpose of *The Finnish Youth Act* (72/2006) is to develop young people’s civic activities and active citizenship as social participation and responsibility, voluntary engagement

¹³ The analysis and argumentation is mainly based on the results of three research projects conducted among Finnish youth: a comparative follow-up research on value shifts of young people in times of economic recession in 1990s (Helve, 2002); a research project on social capital and identity (Helve & Bynner, 2007); and an investigation into values and youth work transitions in the changing labor markets (Helve, 2012; 2013; Svynarenko, 2013; Helve & Evans, 2013). The results of these empirical studies are based on qualitative and quantitative data sets analyzed through mixed methods.

including support for young people's growth and independence, social empowerment of young people, and improvement of their growth and living conditions. The values behind the Youth Act are related to communality and solidarity, equality and non-discrimination, multiculturalism and internationalism, healthy lifestyles and respect for life, and the environment. Finnish youth policy and youth work seemingly attach young people to these values¹⁴.

According to the Finnish Youth Barometer (Myllymäki, 2014), young Finns consider voting mostly as a civic duty (four of five), and almost as many believe that voting influences matters. Every fifth youth (22%) thinks that the decisions made by politicians have no effect on their own life. We can summarize that young Finns have a positive view of the effectiveness of politics and the functioning of democracy. On the other hand, however, the majority believes that they have nothing to say in what the Government and Parliament decide, and half think that political parties are only interested in the votes people cast. Half of young Finns feel that they receive adequate information on their possibilities to participate and influence, but only a minority consider that decision makers in their municipality of residence take their views seriously. For example, every third Finnish young person (33% of women and 28% of men) feels that they had an influence on society during the past year¹⁵. However, political participation was more infrequent; only 7% of young people had participated in political activities. Voting, however, is uncommon among young people, as is active participation in organizations. Youth were more active in signing initiatives, appeals, or petitions, which is common although belief in the impact of such activity was not very strong. Nevertheless, neither illegal nor legal counter-democratic mechanisms generated much enthusiasm among Finnish youth. Young people who voted in elections were also more active in other forms of activities than representative democracy. As for the importance of social media for young Finns, the results showed that nine out of ten of the studied 15 to 29 year

¹⁴ There are 69 national youth organisations and national youth work service organisations, and 37 national youth work organisations in Finland. They all receive operating grants from the Ministry of Education (The Finnish Youth Act; youth work and youth policy: http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Youth/Finland/Finland_YOUTH_WORK_AND_YOUTH_POLICY.pdf).

¹⁵ The corresponding figure for those under 20 years of age was only about one in five.

olds used some type of social media in some manner, for example following the updates and contents of others. However, the act of one's own commenting on sharing content produced by other users was clearly less common; only a minority of those studied actively disseminated content produced by themselves. It seems that observing the media of others is much more common than the production of one's own content and pro-active communication. Nevertheless, passivity and activity accumulate in different modes of activity within a democracy (Myllymäki, 2014, pp. 157-158).

Many young Finns have also reasons for their doubts. For example, according to the Statistics Finland 2010, around 5% of 15 to 29 year olds were excluded from education or employment (Myrskylä, 2012)¹⁶. A new Finnish governmental tool began in 2013 to combat youth unemployment and exclusion called *Youth Guarantee*, and should guarantee every school-leaver a place in upper secondary school, in vocational education, in apprenticeship training, in a youth workshop, in rehabilitation, or some other program. The aim is that every young person will gain a post-compulsory qualification¹⁷. There is also a new youth work tool to engage young people with so-called *outreach* youth work (in Finnish: *etsivä nuorisotyö*). The aim is to help those under 30 years of age who are outside the education or labor market need support to reach public sector services, can't commit to an available service, or who are at risk of social exclusion. The various methods of outreach include street work, detached youth work, mobile youth work, or outreach youth work, depending on target groups and environments. The Finnish Youth Act has set the provisions on outreach youth work and multi-disciplinary cooperation at local levels since 2011¹⁸.

¹⁶ Together 51,300; 18,800 of them were unemployed and 32,500 were so called NEET young people who were Not in Education, Employment or Training.

¹⁷ Some 17% of the current under 25 age group has no post-compulsory qualification (see: http://www.minedu.fi/export/sites/default/OPM/Koulutus/koulutuspolitiikka/Hankkeet/Toisen_asteen_rakennemuutostyot/Liitteet/suuntaviivat.pdf).

¹⁸See:

http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Nuoriso/nuorisotyoen_kohteet_ja_rahoytus/etsiva_nuorisotyoy/?lang=en

The results of Finnish polarization studies (Nuorisobarometri; Autio et.al, 2008) raise important questions for politicians about social risks and casualties for Finnish youth, including school drop-out and unemployment, homelessness, poverty, bullying, and discrimination. Thus, what are the minimum “social guarantees” for a young person at risk with respect to education, training, employment, housing, social support, and income? Such questions are related to citizenship rights and responsibilities: what should they be comprised of, in what contexts, and at what age?

Citizenship and youth values

This section is based on a comparative follow-up research on value changes of young Finns from the end of 1980s to 2011. During this period, Finland experienced intense economic changes, moving from a state of economic prosperity in 1989, where the per capita GDP (Gross domestic product) was the third highest in the world after Japan and Switzerland, to the great recession of the 1990s with the collapse of one of Finland’s largest trade partners, the Soviet Union. Finland rebounded after joining the European Union in 1995, and the explosive growth of the Nokia corporation and other IT businesses. In 2008, however, the country experienced financial trouble with the emergence of the global economic recession.

A Phase 1 was done on the values of Finnish youth in 1989, and covered the responses of 240 young people who were 16 and 19 year olds. A portion of the sample lived in the capital of Finland, Helsinki, and another part in rural Ostrobothnia, in the middle of Finland’s west-cost. This latter Finnish region has always been home to many political and religious movements. Part of the youth went to upper secondary schools or vocational institutions, and the rest were either employed or unemployed. Three years later (1992), 70% of the same young people took part in the follow-up study (Phase 2). Comparison data was collected again three years later (1995-1996) among 457 young people living in Helsinki and Ostrobothnia; these respondents were in upper secondary schools, vocational institutions, and business colleges (Phase 3). A new set of

comparative on-line data was gathered in 2010-2011. Together 689 young people from different parts of Finland completed the survey questionnaire¹⁹. From this comparative research was taken, randomly, a sample of 113 respondents (66 females and 47 males) from the age group of 18-24 year olds (Phase 4). The same 21 attitude scale variables were used throughout the study to measure the value groups in different phases of the study, from 1980s to 2011 (Appendix 1, Table 2)²⁰.

According to the findings from the follow-up data from 1989 and 1992, it was possible to divide young people into three different groups with regard to their values, which were *Humanists*, *Individualists* and *Traditionalists* (Helve, 1993b; 2002). In the analysis of the comparative data from 1995-96, the young people were divided into five value groups²¹:

- *Humanists – Egalitarians* were those whose values stressed gender equality, for example in working life. They had no objections to working for a female boss and in their opinion, work is no less important for a woman than for a man; men and women both need to earn money and take care of their home and family. In their opinion, there should be more women in leadership and other important jobs and it is very important to live according to one's conscience. They would not mind if their children

¹⁹ This research has been published in other articles (Helve, 2012, pp. 135-158; 2013, pp. 119-137; Svyrenko, 2013, pp. 108-118). The data was gathered online between November 15, 2010 and February 15, 2011, on recruitment websites of universities and universities of applied sciences from those in higher education seeking jobs. Together, 689 young people from different parts of Finland completed the questionnaire, which included attitude scales from earlier value studies (Helve, 1993a; 1993b; 2002), work life scales by EVA, the Council of Economic Organizations in Finland (Haavisto, 2010), and future horizon scales by James Côté based on the identity horizon model (Côté et al., 2008; see also Côté & Levine, 2002). The attitude scales measured attitudes towards education, working life, society, and the future orientation and meaning of life. Basic socio-demographic data were also gathered. Students of higher education are experienced Internet users and in this case, they were very conscientious when filling in the questionnaire with 174 variables. There was very little missing data. The long survey has been divided into several parts in terms of topics. The intention was to collect as many responses to the online questionnaire as was possible without using a commercial online-panel, and use this quantitative data side-by-side with the qualitative data to explore the trends and tendencies in work values of young people (Helve, 2013, pp. 125-126; Svyrenko, 2013, pp. 110-111).

²⁰ The factor analysis was carried out using SPSS program.

²¹ This research was published in the book *Arvot, muutokset ja nuoret* (Values, change and young people): Helve, 2002.

went to a school where half of the students were of another race (Helve, 2001, p. 216; Table 15.5.1). From the point of view of citizenship, this group of egalitarians seems to maintain the idea that all humans are equal in fundamental worth or social status, gender or ethnicity, and that they should be treated as equal citizens with equal rights and responsibilities. Such values demonstrate an *egalitarian* citizenship²².

- *Traditionalists – Conservatives* supported such statements as “Couples who have children should not divorce”, “Marriage is for life”, and “Young people today don’t respect the traditional values enough”. These young people agreed with the opinion “Our country needs strong leaders who can restore order and discipline and the respect of right values (Helve, 2001, p. 216; Table 15.5.2). These values show a type of *authoritarian* citizenship (see more: Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer, 1988; 1996). This type of citizenship seems to have a conformist respect for traditional values. These values may be situation specific originating from a desire for sameness and aversion to difference (Stenner, 2005).

- *Environmentalists – Greens* stressed the opinion that the development of economic welfare should not be taken any further. Also, nuclear energy should be given up, even if it would result in a decrease in standard of living. They believed that a continued rise in economic well-being only increases mental suffering, and that science and technology are beginning to control people instead of serving them. They were willing to lower their standard of living in order to decrease pollution and environmental problems. They also believed that, “Even young people can promote world peace by participating in peace work” (Helve, 2001, p. 217; Table 15.5.3). These values fit to environmental citizenship with environmental beliefs about the world, mankind, and where animals have the same status and rights as people. Belonging to this type of citizenship means having a kind of critical value system and world view promoting environmental sustainability. The attitudes of young people showed readiness to change their behavior in considerations for environmental or *ecological* citizenship. Some of them showed a kind of “Green anarchism”

²² According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the concept could be defined either as a political doctrine that all people should be treated as equals and have the same political, economic, social, and civil rights, or as a social philosophy advocating the removal of economic inequalities among people, or the decentralization of power

or eco-anarchism, putting a particular emphasis on environmental issues outside legal activities (cf. the fox girls in Finland)²³. The Greens were ready to act according to the environmental good offering an alternative to the market-based economics by most governments today (see about the theory and practice of environmental citizenship: Dobson & Bell, 2006; Forsyth, 2013).

- *Cynics – Political Passives* agreed with the statements, “Citizens’ opinions don’t have much influence on the decisions made in society”, “The political parties have become estranged from ordinary people and their problems”, and “None of the existing political parties advocate things that are important for me” (Helve, 2001, p. 217; Table 15.5.4). For many young people, politicians and politics appear in the news and media and this coverage encourages them to think about the persons and strategy behind stories, rather than content of policy issues. This increases cynicism toward political parties and politicians (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997), and increases negative evaluations of issues (de Vreese, 2004). The *cynicism* in the citizenship could lead to a reduction of trust in citizenship rights and responsibilities (Dekker et al., 2003, pp. 217-233).

- *Internationalists – Globalists* thought that if more foreign people came to Finland, these contacts would be mutually beneficial. They wouldn’t mind if their children went to a school where half of the students were of another race. They thought that people should have more respect for the conviction of a conscientious objector. In their opinion, it was not a privilege to be Finnish and “East, west, home is best”, was an obsolete phrase. These values represent *cosmopolitanism*; the ideology that all human ethnic groups belong to a single community²⁴. In a cosmopolitan community, individuals from different nation-states form relationships of mutual respect (Kwame, 1997; Helve, 2001, p. 218, Table 15.5.5.)

²³ In Finland, there was in the middle of 1990’s a group of so called “fox girls” who liberated thousands of foxes from fox farms because they believed that foxes should have similar rights to live free like people. Unfortunately, many of the foxes died without food because it was too cold outside.

²⁴ *Cosmopolitan* citizenship values include democratic governance, human rights, peace, and security, with sustainable development in the framework for well-being of all people within planetary boundaries.

Within the groups, differences were found in the values of females and males (Helve, 1997, pp. 171-187). At one end of the spectrum of the internationalists – globalists were the racists, who were more often males, and the majority of whom studied in vocational or business schools and colleges. Their values were nearest the ethno-nationalists type of citizenship. Most authoritarian, traditionalist conservative values were found among secondary school males, and most urban females were against these values. We can assume that secondary school males support mostly authoritarian citizenship values. The most egalitarian-humanistic values were found among secondary school females; they might be most egalitarian in their values of citizenship.²⁵ Vocational school, urban females were most politically passive and critical towards politics. Their values fit best to the cynical citizenship. The most active in politics were urban upper secondary females, and their values were more aligned to ecological citizenship. Business school students valued technology and economic welfare most heavily, whereas secondary school students were most critical of such. Green values were often given as an alternative to technological and economic values (Helve, 2002, pp. 218-222).

The comparative research in 2010-2011 (Phase 4) produced, again, a broader picture of the values of young people. The six different groups with regard to the values were *Neoliberalists*, *Individualists*, *Traditionalists*, *Nationalists*, *Globalists* and *Futurists*.

- *Neoliberalists* were those who accepted differences in people's social status because they indicate how well people have taken advantage of their own possibilities. They were against the idea that state and local governments should share the revenue from those who have better income to those with the lowest. In their mind, even though the standard of living is so high that we could care for the unemployed and other people who are badly off, we must not do so. They also condemned people who take, in

²⁵ Also Beutel and Kirkpatrick Johnson (2004) and Beutel and Marini (1995) have found substantial gender differences in values of adolescents in U.S. These "pro-social" values included e.g. concern about the welfare and rights of others and egoistic or practical concerns. Females were more likely than males to express concern and responsibility for the well-being of others, less likely than males to accept materialism and competition.

their mind, unfair advantage of social services. They think that “idlers” and “spongers” are treated far too well, and believed that the skilled and hardworking always finds a job. The values of this group seem to advocate minimal government and state spending, minimal taxation, minimal regulations, and minimal direct involvement in the state economy. This group comes close to the ideology of economic liberalization, which fits badly to the ideology of the Nordic welfare state. (See Appendix 2, Table 3, Factor 1 - Neoliberalists).

- *Individualists* valued living in harmony with their conscience; this group was open minded²⁶. For example, they would want to have a female boss and they thought that it is as important for a woman to go to work just as much as it is important for a man. In their mind, private human activities and actions have significant impact on the environment and the state of nature. For them, “East west home is best” is an obsolete phrase. This group emphasizes a kind of a moral worth of the individual, for example living in harmony with nature. This value group embraces the right of the individual for freedom and self-realization. These individualists, as citizens, are more interested in their own interests than the interests of society, and in this sense, their citizenship is that of an egoist. (See Appendix 2, Table 3, Factor 2 - Individualists).
- *Traditionalists* in 2010-2011 are, in their value structure, nearest to the Traditionalist-Conservatives from the earlier study in 1995-1996 (Phase 3). However, there were some differences. The strongest factor loading was on the statement “Our country needs strong leaders who can restore order and discipline and the respect of right values”. The moral component of strong leadership is particularly relevant in the recent economic crises, which have hit young people with rapidly growing youth unemployment rates. Also, these young traditionalists share the conservative values of Phase 2. with opinions as “Marriage is for life”, and “Young people today don’t respect the traditional values enough”. It seems so that the economic crises increase conservative *authoritarian* citizenship values (see Appendix

²⁶ Individualism is associated with artistic and bohemian interests and lifestyles where there is a tendency towards self-creation and experimentation as opposed to tradition or popular mass opinions and behaviors. (<https://www.theobjectivestandard.com/issues/2012-spring/individualism-collectivism/>).

2, Table 3, Factor 3 - Traditionalists).

- *Nationalists* were against development aid to foreign countries as long as there are people in need of help in Finland; they don't believe that foreign people could give useful international influence in Finland. They seem to trust political parties and their understanding of ordinary people and their problems. They think that people who take unfair advantage of social services are treated far too well in Finland. This may be related to immigrants who have had difficulties to find a job and are being supported by social services of the state. The values of this group are nearest to those groups who are hostile to immigration.²⁷ It is difficult to know if this group of nationalists has racist tendencies or not at their attitudinal level. It could be possible that populist thoughts are growing inside this group when youth unemployment rates are growing (See Appendix 2, Table 3, Factor 4 - Nationalists).

- *Globalists* think that "East west home is best" is an obsolete phrase. In their mind, it is not a privilege to be a Finnish citizen. They are critical of the continued development of economic well-being, thinking that it only increases mental disparity. Compared to the value group of globalists in 1996 these globalists in the most recent studies seem to be more so against the idea of national citizenship. Their values represent the ideology that all human ethnic groups belong to a single global community. These recent young globalists are more likely than those from the 1990s to be engaged with a world beyond their home country, for example in social media. These young people have traveled abroad more and are also more willing to work abroad. The young people in higher education who were studied are ready to change their lives and future educational or work settings. They have the ability of global citizens to adapt to changes in their life, which depends on their self-confidence and self-awareness, their relationships with others and their understanding of difference, and their capacity for critical analysis of a changing society. This also takes into account that they are still comfortable with their place in the community, and the world, and with expressing or sustaining the sometimes multiple identities they may possess (Helve, 2013, pp. 131-133; see Appendix 2, Table 3, Factor 5 -

²⁷ Populism can combine elements of left and right wing politics. In Finland, the party with populism stances of anti-immigration is the True Finns party, who are critical of the EU.

Globalists).

- *Futurists* represent a new group of values, which are supported more by males²⁸. In their mind, “The science and technology in the future will be able to solve most of the problems encountered today”. They do not support the idea that “There should be more women bosses in important jobs in business and industry”. In the earlier phases of the study, it was already seen that males valued technology more than females. This can be understood as ICT has prioritized male users²⁹. Also, males supported more so the use of nuclear power, while more females were against it³⁰; women seemed more concerned about the risks of nuclear power than men. In this study, a particular set of feminine green and humanist values were observed, which might make them sceptical of technologies they perceive to have the potential to disrupt the balance of nature and to harm living things (Zelezny, et al., 2000)³¹ (See Appendix 2, Table 3, Factor 6 - Globalists).

We can conclude that behind the different value types of young Finns observed in these studies, one could find different citizenship types, with their own citizenship doctrines and values. The most common through different phases of the study was an *egalitarian* citizenship with an idea, that all humans are equal in fundamental worth, social status, gender, and ethnicity, and that they should be treated as equal citizens with equal rights and responsibilities. This type was found among humanists-egalitarians (mostly secondary school females in 1995-1996 - Phase 3). The internationalist and globalists in 2010-2011 (Phase 4) supported the

²⁸ *Futurists*, here, are not in the sense of the art movement futurism or futurologists who attempt to explore possibilities about the future of human society in particular, or of life on Earth in general.

²⁹ There is a large body of research from a variety of disciplines on female under-representation in science and technologies, which also cares about “gender blindness” on technological design.

³⁰ This was seen especially in the Phase 3 among the group of Environmentalists – Greens, who were mostly females. Women are consistently found to be more skeptical about the benefits of nuclear power than men are (Mobley & Kilbourne, 2013; Davidson & Freudenburg, 1996; Stern, et al., 1993).

³¹ Females have more environmental values. This can be because girls are socialized to be emotional, caring, and attentive to the connections between living things, while boys are socialized to be more aggressive and competitive (Thorne, 1993).

ideology of *cosmopolitanism*, that all human ethnic groups belong to a single community and that all individuals from different nation-states form relationships of mutual respect. In the group of environmentalists (Phase 3) were more females who had *ecological* citizenship beliefs about the world, mankind, and that animals have the same status and rights as people and all other human beings. The *cynicism* citizenship type was found in the 1992 among individualist and 1996 among cynics who were mostly politically passive and critical vocational school urban females. Secondary school traditionalist-conservative males mostly embraced *authoritarian* citizenship. There were also more males in the group of racists in the earlier studies with *ethno-nationalist* citizenship values which could be found among female and male nationalists in 2011. The new group in 2011 were neoliberalists with *liberal* citizenship type. They can represent a new growing “heartless” generation³². There were gender differences of value groups also found in 2011 (Phase 4) among female individualists who support living in harmony with nature and who will take individual responsibility on the environment and the state of nature. They also supported equality in working life.

Among the futurists were more males with beliefs in science and technology being able to solve most of the problems encountered today (see Table 1). It was possible to find the following seven different citizenship types behind the youth value groups and set of beliefs: *Egalitarian, Cosmopolitan, Ecological, Cynical, Authoritarian, Ethno-national and Neoliberal*. The values and beliefs of young people through all phases of the study from 1989 to 2011 represent mostly egalitarian citizenship type. Also authoritarian type was found in all phases. In 1996 cosmopolitan, ecological, cynical and ethno-national types were found and in the 2011 research a new neoliberal type of citizenship was found.

This kind of typology is always very abstract, however, we could summarize that the citizenship values of young Finns includes multiple attitudes and values, which form an *inconsistent* value world.

³² We have to ask if those values are growing among well educated young generation of Finns, does it mean the slow death of solidarity?

Table 1. Summary of the citizenship types, value groups, set of beliefs, and gender differences in different phases of the study

Citizenship type	Value groups	Set of beliefs	Gender differences	Phase of study			
				1	2	3	4
Egalitarian	Humanists – Egalitarians Individualists	Equal citizenship rights and responsibilities	- More often females	x	x	x	x
Cosmopolitan	Internationalists – Globalists	Respect of various cultural, religious or political ideologies	- More often females			x	
	Globalists		No gender differences				x
Ecological	Environmentalists – Greens	Environmental sustainability	-More often females			x	
	Individualists	Animal right Private activities	More often females				x
Cynical	Cynics – Political Passives	Negative attitudes and beliefs to politics	-More often females			x	
			No gender differences				x
Authoritarian	Traditionalists – Conservatives	Conformist respect for traditional values	- More often males	x	x	x	
	Traditionalists Futurists	Science and technology solve the future problems					x
Ethno-national	Racists	*Ethno-nationalist solidarity to the own nation and its members	- More often males			x	
	Nationalists		-No gender differences				x
Neoliberal	Neoliberalists	Take advantage of own abilities regarding own concepts of the good life	- No gender differences				x

Behind this can be found different types of citizenship values, as well as gender and educational differences in citizenship values of young people. The citizenship value types observed included more postmodern than modern values (cf. World Values Survey: Welzel & Inglehart 2008; Inglehart, 1997). We can interpret that females, more so than males, support such postmaterialistic values as gender equality, human and animal rights, tolerance of different ethnic groups, globalization, and environmentalism. Their type of citizenship is more often *egalitarian, cosmopolitan, ecological, and cynical*. In contrast, males had more materialist values. There were more conservative traditionalist males with authoritarian values than females (Beutel & Kirkpatrick Johnson, 2004; Beutel & Marini, 1995).

Their citizenship fits more within the *authoritarian and ethno-nationalist* type. The new value group of futurists requires more research to be done on their gender values, roles, and stereotypes. In particular, research could be done on career trajectories of women and men, cultures in technological design, and the rights of women and men in Internet, as these factors can have an impact on the global consequences on women's and men's lives as citizens³³.

Values and social relations still shape and maintain gender ideologies and identities. The educational system should be the key to redefining traditional gendered relations, for example, with technology and to promote positive gender impact.

However, we have to notice that a young person may embrace very different attitudes and values simultaneously, a portion of which are materialist and a portion of which are postmaterialist. The comparative follow-up study of the value shifts indicate a decline in postmaterialist values among young people during the period of economic recession. Economic scarcity can thus be seen as generating materialistic "hard" values. The same young people, however, also valued issues other than material goods. For example, most youth were ready to compromise their own standard of living in order to protect, among other things, the environment and help the less fortunate (Helve, 2002, pp. 185-187).

³³ Even though females are overrepresented compared to males in Finnish higher education, their progress in important jobs in business and industry moves at a slow pace.

The comparative follow-up study gives evidence that, although different value structures and citizenship types can be found, only a few young people clearly belonged to just one category. Because young people are not tied to the values of any given ideology, they choose different values according to their life situations in which they find themselves (Bourdieu, 1984; Lyotard, 1986). Thus, one young person may have both cosmopolitan and racists ethno-nationalists with context-sensitive citizenship values, which is perhaps a rational or reflexive response to postmodern uncertainty.

Social capital and identity

Education is a part of human and social capital (Schuller, 2007, pp. 187-194). Canadian sociologist James Côté has proposed a third capital concept, the *identity capital*³⁴. In identity formation, social capital helps in the transition from school to work and to an adult citizen. Trust of other people supports identity formation and is based on having similar values. Identification to a group increases trust, communication, and cooperation with other people. The values and norms of the group where young people feel that they belong will also define their self-image and ego-identity (Côté & Levine, 2002; Putnam, 2000).

The identities are strongly influenced by circumstances, such as economic factors, education, the home, social contacts, and the media. The formation of youth identity and social capital is greatly affected by how children and youth spend their time. Spare time is also more important for youth today than ever before. Young people seem to choose their hobbies based on their personal traits and social relationships. Their hobbies can even affect their choice of education and career, as well as their happiness and well-being. Those with a lot of hobbies acquire social, cultural, and identity capital for later life, which navigates them through the process of transition to adult citizenship (Feinstein, et al., 2006, pp. 305-327; Feixa, et. al., 2001, pp. 289-304).

³⁴ This chapter is based on a research project about the formation of youth identity and social capital within the Academy of Finland Research Programme on Social Capital and Networks of Trust (SoCa).

Identity development as citizenship formation is closely connected with the socialization process, or the process of becoming a part of the community by learning its norms, customs, and traditions. Minority youth come from different backgrounds and their minority identity and citizenship values are based on their cultural (ethnic or religious) background community, which enable them better to cope with inequality and exclusion; they have their social capital from their minority cultures and networks. Education helps them bridge out into the broader community.

The investigations of Kuusisto (2011) and Honkasalo (2011) show that minority young people have specific resources for bonding with family networks and communities, which can help them also in bridging to networks of majority communities during transitions to education and work. However, in the transition to adulthood and citizenship, strong bonds to the family and the minority community can negatively affect social exclusion, bridging, social inclusion, social networks, social integration, and participation in the majority community.

Young people's networks and trust-based relationships are not only a manifestation of growing up as a "sub-cultural response" to the oppressive structures and instruments of coercion of the adult world, but a vital means of demonstrating how society can transform. Their social capital is thus not only of immediate value in supplying a kind of security in the teenage world, but through the use of new technology like mobile phones and the internet, it offers models that may be of vital importance to effective adult citizenship participation.

Action competence and citizenship

Instead of formal school education, non- and in-formal learning mediums, for example new digital media, creates beliefs, attitudes, and values through which young people interpret their citizenship. Through leisure time hobbies, consumption, and media use, young people themselves explore, develop, and maintain competencies they need as adult citizens. Young people are shaping new forms of citizenship in their leisure time activities on the Internet, expressing their political voices and new senses of belonging to society as members of a new contemporary

citizenship (see also Vinken, 2005, pp. 147-157).

The Internet, with global websites such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and so on, has promoted the development of a multi-value society where there may no longer be a primary need for face-to-face communication with peers. Everyday, new technologies and communication methods are affecting young people's values, beliefs, and lifestyles. For example, some young people are very brand familiar and they brand their identities in social media, which clearly affects their choices as consumers and lifestyles as consumers. However, it is important to remember that young people are not alike.

A consensus about what constitutes youth citizenship is difficult to find. One perspective could be *action competence*, which is understood as a young person's capability to live a *good life* as an autonomous human being and as an active and responsible citizen (see about capability approach: Sen, 1985; Nussbaum, 2011). As it applies to human capital, capability represents the intersection of capacity and ability.

Action competence sees a young person as subject of his or her own well-being, for example, as an active agent in constructing one's own life. The important question is: how can young people be supported to become active subjects of their life by formal and non-formal education, including the use of Internet and other media environments and networks associated with their leisure time?

The citizenship values of young people seem partly to be formed in the process of dialogic interaction with peers (online or offline) and media. It is important to recognize school curriculums of formal education and the connections between the individual, the community, and society. Citizenship's important goals relate to attaining and maintaining autonomy, as well as building relationships with others.

School curriculums should be related to citizenship formation, influencing adolescent transitions to adulthood (Côté, et al., 2008). The collective idea of what citizenship includes can offer tools and orientation for developing personal citizenship values that help in coping with shifts to adulthood.

From the perspective of development of youth citizenship, an important question to ask is, if it is possible to develop those competencies and skills that enable young people to take critical action when forming their

citizenship? When young people learn to use critical thinking to explore meaningful citizenship issues, for example, environmental or animal rights, this gives them the possibility to visualize how they would implement what improvements they would like to see as citizens. Their discussions about issues important to them help them decide what is possible and to identify what could help them to achieve their goals.

Youth work and youth policy

Youth work can play an important role in developing the autonomy, empowerment, and citizenship of young people (Williamson, 1997). It has an added social value in transmitting universal values regarding human rights, democracy, peace, anti-racism, cultural diversity, solidarity, equality, and sustainable development. It can promote social participation and responsibility, voluntary engagement and active citizenship, strengthen community building and civil society at all levels (e.g. intergenerational and intercultural dialogue).

Youth work can contribute to the development of young people's creativity, cultural and social awareness, entrepreneurship, and innovation. It provides opportunities for the social inclusion of all children and young people, especially through reaching young people with fewer opportunities³⁵.

The aim of the EU *Youth in Action* program (2007–2013) has been to inspire a sense of active European citizenship, solidarity, and tolerance among young Europeans, and to involve them in shaping the European Union's future. It has promoted mobility within and beyond the EU's borders, non-formal learning, intercultural dialogue, and encourages the inclusion of all young people, regardless of their educational, social, and cultural background. It supports youth exchanges and voluntary activities, and gives young people the opportunity to become involved in their societies, to gain multicultural experiences through participation.

³⁵ A contribution to youth work and youth policy in European. Report of the Belgian EU Presidency Youth 1/7/2010 – 31/12/2010). Retrieved from <http://www.flanders.be/en/publications/detail/a-contribution-to-youth-work-and-youth-policy-in-europe>.

The Council of Europe has set the *Developing European youth co-operation through youth policy, youth work and non-formal education/learning* program in the youth sector (2010 – 2013) including *Human rights and democracy, Living together in diverse societies* and *Youth on the Move*.

These programs indicate that learning does not take place only in formal teaching/learning, but also through non-formal education/learning, self-directed learning, informal learning, peer learning, and so on (COM, 2010, 477 final, p. 22)³⁶.

Discussion

Facilitating youth employment and ensuring that young people have access to decent work should be among the most important ways of fostering their participation in society and becoming independent citizens. Unfortunately, the rate of youth unemployment in many EU countries, as in the global world, is more than double the overall unemployment rate, and these circumstances have deepened young people's social exclusion. This has undoubtedly facilitated marginalization, vulnerability, and poverty among young people leading to certain types of risky behavior.

The insecure situation of young people today has led already to riots among “the precariat activists” (in French *la précarité*) in southern and central Europe, and also in Finland. *EuroMay Day* demonstrations have even spread as far as Japan (there referred to as “Indies Mayday demonstrations” – Ichiyo, 2008). These riots by precariat youth activists have been both political and sociological by nature.

There is a growing emphasis on participation at local, national, European, and global levels, and at the same time, for example, less young people participate in formal organizations and political elections. There is a danger that if the EU fails in its policies towards minorities and vulnerable groups, such as young people, leaving them to take action for themselves,

³⁶ See more: http://ec.europa.eu/youthonthemove/about/index_en.htm; http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/IG_Coop/Agenda_2020_en.asp

some might prefer non-institutional or non-formal ways of collective action and citizenship participation.

Many factors mentioned above affect young people's transitions to adulthood; their participation in societal activities and their role as citizens will be a serious challenge for the state. The inability to find a job carries psychological costs, causes frustration and depression, and undermines motivation. Youth unemployment is also often associated with such social problems as violence, delinquency, alcohol and drug abuse, crime, and suicide (UNICEF, 2000).

Unemployment contributes to risky behavior among young people, including unsafe sex and drug abuse. The socio-economic implications of these conditions are serious, including potentially costly health predicaments and the transmission of poverty on to following generations.

It can be argued that the main focus of civic socialization could be put at the leisure and consumption domains. This not only goes for social media use and the role of the Internet, but also for other types of activities within these domains. Non-voting does not appear to be an active political choice, yet rather election passivity or a mismatch between one's own life situation and the modes of activity represented by political parties.

Leisure time activities, whether online in a virtual world or offline in the real world, take up a large portion of young people's time and can have the same civic result as online Internet use - they can yield new forms of solidarity, community life, and involvement in the common good. Take for example politically inspired consumerism, where buying ecologically friendly goods and boycotting goods with contrary traits is central. Through these channels, young people build trust, share collective interests, and more directly hope to solve problems.

For young people, citizenship often refers to participation in community life, which may or may not be political. Young people's online activities bring together multiple role activities that can facilitate civic engagement and also political participation. Many online activities can bring together minorities and other excluded youth groups, for example in remote geographical locations, and thus, cyberspace can offer youth a better sense of citizenship rather than offline spaces.

Although online activities can deepen young people's civic engagement, it can also foster isolation and disengagement. Ultimately, more

sociological research on *digital citizenship* is imperative (Keats & Norton, 2011).

References

- Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). *The authoritarian personality*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Allatt, P. (2001). Critical Discussion: Globalization and Empowerment. In H. Helve & C. Wallace (Eds.), *Youth, Citizenship and Empowerment* (pp. 250-259). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Altemeyer, B. (1988). *Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-Wing Authoritarianism*. Mississauga: Jossey-Bass.
- Armstrong, C. (2006). *Rethinking Equality: The Challenge of Equal Citizenship*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Autio, M., Eräranta, K., & Myllyniemi, S. (Eds.). (2008). *Polarisoituva nuoruus? Nuorten elinolot -vuosikirja 2008*. Nuorisotutkimusverkosto/Nuorisotutkimusseura, julkaisuja 84. Helsinki: Hakapaino.
- Bauman, Z., & Lyon, D. (2012). *Liquid Surveillance: A Conversation*. United Kingdom: Polity Press.
- Beck, U. (1992). *Risk society. Towards a new modernity*. London: Sage Publications.
- Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002). *Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences*. London: Sage.
- Beutel, A. M., & Kirkpatrick, J. M. (2004). Gender and prosocial values during adolescence. A Research Note. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 45(2), 379-393. DOI: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.2004.tb00017.x
- Beutel, A. M., & Marini, M. M. (1995). Gender and values. *American Sociological Review*, 60, 436-448.
- Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction*. London: Routledge.
- Buckingham, D., & Rodríguez-Hoyos, C. (2013). Learning about power and citizenship in an online virtual world. *Comunicar*, 20(40), 49-57. doi: 10.3916/C40-2013-02-05
- Brown, A. (1998). 'Doing Time': The Extended Present of the Long-Term Prisoner. *Time & Society*, 7, 93-103.
- Bynner, J., Chisholm, L., & Furlong, A. (Eds.). (1997). *Youth, Citizenship and Social Change in European Context*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Cappella, J. N., & Jamieson, K. H. (1997). *Spiral of cynicism: The press and the public good*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Castronova, E. (2005). *Synthetic worlds: The business and culture of online games*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cohen, E. F. (2009). *Semi-citizenship in democratic politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Côté, J. (2000). *Arrested Adulthood: The Changing Nature of Maturity and Identity*. New York: New York University Press.
- Côté, J. & Levine, C. (2002). *Identity Formation, Agency and Culture. A Social Psychological Synthesis*. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Côté, J. (2005). Identity capital, social capital and the wider benefits of learning: generating resources facilitative of social cohesion. *London review of education*, 3(3), 221-37. doi: 10.1080/14748460500372382
- Côté, J. (2014). "The "digital native" debate: An appraisal of pedagogical and generational claims. In L. Chisholm & V. Deliyanni-Kouimitzi (Eds.), *Changing Landscapes of Childhood and Youth in Europe* (pp. 86-109). Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press.
- Côté, J. E., Skinkle, R., & Motte, A. (2008). Do perceptions of costs and benefits of postsecondary education influence participation? *Canadian Journal of Higher Education*, 38(3), 79-93.
- Craig, B. (2014). *Individualism vs. Collectivism: Our Future, Our Choice*. Retrieved from: <https://www.theobjectivestandard.com/issues/2012-spring/individualism-collectivism/>.
- Davidson, D., & Freudenberg, W. (1996). Gender and environmental risk concerns: A review and analysis of available research. *Environment & Behavior*, 28(3), 302-339.
- Dekker, P., Ester, P., & Vinken, H. (2003). Civil society, social trust and democratic involvement. In W. Arts, J. Hagenaars & L. Halman (Eds.), *The cultural diversity of European unity. Explanations, findings and reflections from the European Values Study* (pp. 217-253). Leiden & Boston: Brill.
- Dobson, A., & Bell, D. (Eds.). (2006). *Environmental Citizenship*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Earls, F., & Carlson, M. (2002). Adolescents as collaborators. In M. Tienda & W. J. Wilson (Eds.), *Youth in Cities: A Cross-National Perspective* (pp. 58-83). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ester, P., & Vinken, H. (2003). Debating civil society. On the fear of civic decline and hope for the Internet alternative. *International Sociology*, 18(4), 659-680.
- Etsivä nuorisotyö (Outreached youth work). Retrieved from: http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Nuorisotyö/nuorisotyoen_kohteet_ja_rahoitus/etsiva_nuorisotyö/?lang=en
- European Commission (2001). *A new impetus for European youth*. White paper. COM/2001/0681 final
- European Commission (2012). *EU Youth Report 2012*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
- EVA (1991). *Suomi etsii itseään. Raportti suomalaisten asenteista 1991* (Report of the attitudes of Finns 1991 by the Centre of Business and Policy Studies).
- Feinstein, L., Bynner J., & Duckworth, K. (2006). Young people's leisure contexts and their relations to adult outcomes. *Journal of Youth Studies*, 9, 305-327.
- Feixa, C., Costa, C., & Pallarés, J. (2001). From okupas to makineros. Citizenship and youth cultures in Spain. In A. Furlong & I. Guidikova (Eds.), *Transitions of youth citizenship in Europe. Culture, subculture and identity* (pp. 289-304). Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.

- Frazer, E., & Emler, N. (1997). Participation and citizenship. A new agenda for youth politics research. In J. Bynner, L. Chisholm, & A. Furlong (Eds.), *Youth, citizenship and social change in a European context* (pp. 171-195). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Forsyth, T. (2013). *Critical Political Ecology: The Politics of Environmental Science*. New York: Routledge.
- Fromm, E. (1942). *The Fear of Freedom*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Gudmundsson, G. (2001). Youth unemployment in the Nordic countries in the 1990s'. *Young. Nordic Journal of Youth Research*, 9(2), 59-62.
- Haavisto, I. (2010). *Työelämän kulttuurivallankumous* (Cultural revolution of the working life). EVA:n arvo- ja asennetutkimus 2010. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino.
- Helsingin kaupungin tietokeskus (2014). Retrieved from: <http://www.hel.fi/hki/Tieke/fi/Etusivu>.
- Helve, H. (1993a). *The World View of Young People. A Longitudinal Study of Finnish Youth Living in a Suburb of Metropolitan*. Helsinki: Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, Ser. B, Tom. 267. Helsinki: Gummerus.
- Helve, H. (1993b). Socialization of attitudes and values among young people in Finland. *Young. Nordic Journal of Youth Research*, 1(3), 27-39.
- Helve, H. (1997). Values, World Views and Gender Differences among Young People. In H. Helve & J. Bynner (Eds.), *Youth and Life Management. Research Perspectives* (pp. 171-187). Helsinki: University Press.
- Helve, H. (1998). Perspectives on Social Exclusion, Citizenship and Youth. In H. Helve (Ed.), *Unification and Marginalisation of Young People* (pp. 211-221). Finnish Youth Research 2000 Programme. Helsinki: The Finnish Youth Research Society.
- Helve, H. (2001). Reflexivity and Changes in attitudes and Value Structures. In H. Helve & C. Wallace, *Youth, Citizenship and Empowerment* (pp. 201-218). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Helve, H. (2002). *Arvot, muutos ja nuoret*. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press.
- Helve, H. (2006). Social Changes and Multicultural Values of Young People. In C. Leccardi & E. Ruspini (Eds.), *A New Youth? Young People, Generations and Family Life* (pp. 103-124). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Helve, H. (2010). Nuorten asenteet, arvot ja maailmankuvat. Nuorten hyvin ja pahoinvointi. *Suomalainen Lääkäriseura Duodecim, Suomen Akatemia* (pp. 80-89). Retrieved from: <http://www.duodecim.fi/kotisivut/docs/fl595320904/konsensus2010artikkelikirja.pdf>
- Helve, H. (2012). Transitions and shifts in work attitudes, values and future orientations of young Finns. In M. Hahn-Bleibtreu & M. Molgat (Eds.), *Youth policy in a changing world: from theory to practice* (pp. 135-158). Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers.
- Helve, H. (2013). From higher education to working life: Work values of young Finns in changing labour markets. In Helve, H. & Evans K. (Eds.), *Youth and work transitions in changing social landscapes* (pp. 119-137). London: Tufnell Press.
- Helve, H., & Bynner, J. (Eds.). (1997). *Youth and Life Management. Research Perspectives*. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press.
- Helve H., & Bynner, J. (Eds.). (2007). *Youth and Social Capital*. London: Tufnell Press.
- Helve, H., & Evans, K. (2013). *Youth and work transitions in changing social landscapes*. London: Tufnell Press.

- Hoikkala, T. (2009). The diversity of youth citizenships in the European Union. *Young Nordic Journal of Youth Research*, 17(5), pp. 421-442. doi: 10.1177/110330880801700102
- Holland, J. (2007). Inventing adulthoods: Making the most of what you have. In H. Helve & J. Bynner (Eds.), *Youth and Social Capital* (pp. 11-28). London: Tufnell Press.
- Honkasalo, V. (2011). *Tyttöjen kesken. Monikulttuurisuus ja sukupuolten tasa-arvo nuorisotyössä*. (diss.) Helsinki: Nuorisotutkimusverkosto-Nuorisotutkimusseura, julkaisuja 109.
- Ichiyo, M. (2009). Neoliberal Spell is Broken: Some Signs of Change and Hope Retrieved from: <http://www.ppjaponesia.org/modules/tinycontent/index.php?id=5>.
- Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and Postmodernization*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Jones, G., & Wallace, C. (1992). *Youth, Family and Citizenship*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Keats, D., & Norton, H. (2011). Intermediaries and hate speech: Fostering digital citizenship for our information age. *Boston University Law Review*, 91, 1435.
- Klausen, J. (1995). Social Rights Advocacy and State Building: T. H. Marshall in the Hands of Social Reformers, *World Politics*, 47(2), 244-267. doi: 10.1017/S0043887100016099
- Kroger, J. (2007). *Identity development: Adolescence through adulthood*. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Kwame, A. A. (1997). Cosmopolitan Patriots. *Critical Inquiry*, 23(3), 617-639.
- Kuusisto, A. (2011). *Growing up in Affiliation with Religious Community. A Case Study of Seventh-day Adventist Youth in Finland*. Research on Religious and Spiritual Education, Vol 3. Münster: Waxmann.
- Leccardi, C. (2006). Uncertainty, Temporality and Biographies in the New century. In C. Leccardi & E. Ruspini (Eds.), *A new youth? Young people, generations and family life* (pp. 15-40). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Lehdonvirta, V., Wilska, T.-A., & Johnson, M. (2009). Virtual consumerism: case habbo hotel. *Information, communication & society*, 12(7), 1059-1079.
- Lyotard, J-F. (1986). *The Postmodern Condition*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Marshall, T. H. (1950). *Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mobley, C., & Kilbourne, W. (2013). Gender Differences in Pro-Environmental Intentions: A Cross-National Perspective on the Influence of Self-Enhancement Values and Views on Technology. *Sociological Inquiry*, 83(2), 310-332. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-682X.2012.00431.x
- Mäntymäki, M., & Salo, J. (2011). Teenagers in social virtual worlds: Continuous use and purchasing behavior in Habbo Hotel. *Computers in Human Behavior*, 27(6), 2088-2097.
- Myllyniemi, S. (2014). Vaikuttava osa. *Nuorisobarometri 2013 Nuorisosaian neuvottelukunnan julkaisuja* nro 50. Helsinki: Hakapaino.
- Myllyniemi, S. (2009). Taidekohtia. *Nuorisobarometri 2009*. Nuoralle laatinut tutkija Sami Myllyniemi. Publications of Youth Research Society – n. 97.
- Myrskylä, P. (2012). *HUKASSA – Keitä ovat syrjäytyneet nuoret?* Helsinki: Elinkeinoelämän valtuuskunta. Retrieved from: <http://www.eva.fi/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Syrjaytyminen.pdf>.

- Nussbaum, M. (2011). *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Palttala, P. (2014) Maahanmuuttajataustaisten lasten osuus vaihtelee Helsingin kouluissa nolllasta 60 prosenttiin. *Helsingin Sanomat, Kaupunki* 29.9.2014.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Rifkin, J. (1995). *The End of Work: the Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-market Era*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.
- Schuller, T. (2007). Social capital and young people. In H. Helve & J. Bynner (Eds.), *Youth and Social Capital* (pp. 187-193). London: Tufnell Press.
- Sen, A. (1985). *Commodities and Capabilities*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
- Smith, A. D. (1991). *National Identity*. London: Penguin.
- Somers, M. R. (2008). *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Statistical Yearbook of the Netherlands (2007). *Population*. Voorburg/Heerlen.
- Stenner, K. (2005). *The Authoritarian Dynamic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stern, P. C., Dietz, T., & Kalof, L. (1993). Value Orientations, Gender, and Environmental Concern. *Environment and Behavior*, 25(3), pp. 322-348.
- Sterri, A. B. (Ed.). (2014). *Global Citizen. Challenges and Responsibility in an Interconnected World*. Rotterdam: Sense.
- Subrahmanyam, K., & Smahel, D. (2010). *Digital Youth: The Role of Media in Development*. New York: Springer Science & Business Media.
- Svynarenko, A. (2013). Regional identities future expectations and work values. In H. Helve & K. Evans (Eds.), *Youth and work transitions in changing social landscapes* (pp. 108-118). London: Tufnell Press.
- The Finnish Youth Act (2006). Retrieved from: http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Youth/Finland/Finland_Youth_Act_amended_2010.pdf
- The Finnish Youth Act - Youth work and youth policy (2006). Retrieved from: http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Youth/Finland/Finland_YOUTH_WORK_AND_YOUTH_POLICY.pdf
- Thorne, B. (1993). *Gender Play: Girls and Boys in School*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Turner, B. S. (Ed.). (1993). *Citizenship and Social Theory*. London: Sage.
- Tyyskää, V. (1998). Changing Family Structure and Children's Welfare: Global Perspectives. In A. Sev'er (Ed.), *Frontiers in Women's Studies: Canadian and German Perspectives* (pp. 45-58). Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press.
- UNICEF (2000). *Young People in Changing Societies: Regional Monitoring Report No. 7*. Florence: The MONEE Project, CEE/ CIS/ Baltics, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre.
- UNICEF (2006). *Child Protection Information Sheet*. Retrieved from: http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Child_Protection_Information_Sheets.pdf.
- Zelezny, L. C., Chua, P., & Aldrich, C. (2000). Elaborating on Gender Differences in Environmentalism. *Journal of Social Issues*, 56(3), 443-457.

- de Vreese, C. (2004). The effects of strategic news on political cynicism, issue evaluations, and policy support: A two-wave experiment. *Mass Communication and Society*, 7, 191-214.
- Vinken, H. (2005). Young people's civic engagement. The need for new perspectives. In H. Helve & G. Holm (Eds.), *Contemporary Youth research. Local Expressions and Global Connections* (pp. 147-157). Burlington: Ashgate.
- Welzel, C., & Inglehart, R. (2008). The role of ordinary people in democratization. *Journal of Democracy*, 19(1), 126-140.
- Williamson, H. (1997). Youth work and citizenship. In J. Bynner, L. Chisholm & A. Furlong (Eds.), *Youth, Citizenship and Social Change in European Context* (pp. 196-213). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Wyn, J., & White, R. (1997). *Rethinking youth*. London: Sage.

Appendix 1- Table 2. The phases and methods of the research

1989	Phase 1. 16-19 year olds Methods	123 girls, 117 boys (n = 240) - Questionnaires - Word association and sentence completion tests - Individual and group focused interviews (video taped) - Attitude scales
1992	Phase 2. Follow-up study 19-22 year olds Methods	93 girls, 72 boys (n = 165) - Questionnaires - Word association and sentence completion tests - Attitude scales
1995-1996	Phase 3. Comparative study 16-19 year olds Methods	228 female, 229 male (n = 457) - Questionnaires - Word association and sentence completion tests - Attitude scales
2010-2011	Phase 4. Comparative study 18-24 year olds (n= 689) Methods	Gender balanced random sample 66 female, 47 male (n = 113) - Online Survey - Attitude scales

Appendix 2-Table 3. Factor loadings in six factor solution in the study of phase 4 (2011)

Factors: F1 = Neoliberalists - F2 = Individualists - F3= Traditionalists - F4= Nationalists - F5= Globalists - F6= Futurists	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6
1. Differences in people's social status are acceptable because they indicate advantage of their own possibilities	.81	-.13	.06	.02	.08	.04
2. People who take unfair advantage of the social services, idlers and spongers are treated far too well	.64	.10	.18	.48	-.01	-.03
3. Skilled and hardworking always find a job	.59	.12	.21	-.10	-.18	.05
4. Our country needs strong leaders who can restore order and discipline and the respect of right values	.23	.00	.74	.37	.06	.05
5. Private human activities and actions do not have any significant impact on the environment and nature	.17	-.48	.16	.10	.10	.01
6. It is a privilege to be Finnish	.18	.26	.25	-.09	-.71	-.07
7. I would not want a woman to be my boss	.15	-.65	.45	-.05	.01	.11
8. Young people today don't respect the traditional values enough	.13	-.22	.71	.32	-.17	-.13
9. I think that every person must have the freedom to live as they wish	.06	.41	-.12	-.05	.32	.44
10. It is less important for a woman to go to work than it is for a man	.05	-.46	.51	-.15	-.04	.28
11. Development aid to foreign countries should not be increased if there is need of help in Finland	.04	-.12	.23	.79	-.05	.12
12. Marriage is for life	.02	-.07	.68	-.03	-.26	-.22
13. "East west home is best" is an obsolete phrase	.01	.07	-.14	-.28	.77	-.04
14. For me, it is important to live in harmony with my conscience	-.02	.79	.05	-.15	.03	-.08
15. If more foreign people came to Finland, we would benefit from useful international influence	-.12	.41	-.07	-.65	.32	.00
16. Science and technology in the future will be able to solve most of the problems encountered today	-.13	-.06	-.12	.00	-.02	.70
17. There should be more women bosses in important jobs in business and industry	-.35	.21	-.11	-.13	.20	-.55
18. The continued development of economic well-being only increases mental ill-being	-.43	.23	.21	.14	.54	-.26
19. The political parties have become estranged from ordinary people and their problems	-.45	.15	-.08	.54	.32	-.20
20. Our standard of living is so high that we must have the means to care for the people who are badly off	-.58	.48	.15	-.00	.07	.28
21. State and local governments will share the revenue coming along better with the lowest income	-.74	.33	-.10	-.08	.15	.02

In the online survey of 2010-2011, together 21 attitude statements were derived from the earlier phases of the study to measure attitudes principal components followed by Varimax rotation produced in 2011, in the study phase 4 in the age group of 18-24 year olds. The gender was balanced because females were significantly more interested than males in taking part of the online survey (81% of the total sample of 689; see, Svnarenko 2013, p. 110). Because of the generally high level of the factor loadings a minimum cut off for significance was set at .44. Factor number 1 accounted 23,3% of the total variance, Factor 2. accounted 11%, Factor 3 accounted 8,5 %, Factor 4 accounted 7,1 %, Factor 5 accounted 6,5% and Factor 6. accounted 5,9%. The total variance of 6 factors explained 62,44% of the total variance. The factor loadings were much higher than in earlier phases. Analysis of variance enables us to determine whether observed difference in the mean (average) values of a variable between females and males might have arisen by chance. The results showed statistically significant differences in the mean score for the values of females and males in factors 2 and 6 (the normality and t-test).